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Tax Treaty Disputes: A Global
Quantitative Analysis
eduardo baistrocchi and martin hearson
1 Introduction
This chapter offers the ﬁrst global quantitative analysis of tax treaty
disputes emerging in the ﬁrst almost 100 years of the international tax
regime (ITR).1 The time and space dimensions of the analysis are as
follows. The time dimension covers the era that ran from 1923 – when
four economists produced the League of Nations’ Report on Double
Taxation,2 proposing a legal technology that is now encapsulated in the
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD
MTC) – until 2015, when the G20 and the OECD published the Base
Erosion and Proﬁt Shifting 2015 Final Reports (BEPS Reports), which
‘represents the ﬁrst substantial renovation of the international tax stand-
ards in almost a century’ (pre-BEPS Reports Era).3 The space dimension
of this analysis covers the G20 countries.
This chapter explores variations in the number, nature and outcome of
leading tax treaty disputes along three axes: (1) across time, (2) between
G20 countries and (3) among the different clauses of the OECD MTC.
Using a new dataset of 1,610 leading tax treaty disputes in G20 countries
compiled by working with the chapter authors of this book, this chapter
sheds light on some of these trends for the ﬁrst time.
1 Literature on the ITR is broad and deep. Some excellent surveys on the ITR are listed in
Volume 1, Chapter 1, ‘Introduction’, fn. 5.
2 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission, Report on Double Taxation
Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir
Josiah Stamp, League of Nations document No. E.F.S.73.F.19 (Geneva: League of Nations,
1923) (1923 Report). The authors of the 1923 Report were four eminent economists: Prof.
Bruins of Commercial University, Rotterdam; Prof. Senator Einaudi of Turin University;
Prof. Seligman of Columbia University; and Sir Josiah Stamp of London University.
3 OECD/G20, Base Erosion and Proﬁt Shifting Project: Explanatory Statement. 2015 Final
Reports (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), p. 5, available at: www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explana
tory-statement-2015.pdf.
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Our analysis reveals an important new aspect of the strategic inter-
action among G20 countries and non-G20 hubs in the pre-BEPS Reports
Era (1923–2015).4 It is widely understood that G20 countries compete
against each other for capital, just as private ﬁrms compete for market
share, using tools at their disposal such as their corporate tax rates.5
Bilateral tax treaties concluded with non-G20 hubs, particularly with the
Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium, allow these hubs to serve as
outlets for the bundled products that G20 countries offer to international
investors. The importance of these non-G20 hubs as conduit jurisdictions
for multinational tax structures, highlighted in the OECD’s BEPS
Reports, is reﬂected in our data showing the important number of court
disputes in G20 countries related to tax treaties with non G-20 hubs.6
One component of the bundle of products offered by G20 countries is the
interaction of domestic laws with tax treaties, which serves as a vehicle to
minimise investors’ tax entry costs and/or tax exit costs. The main treaty
articles subject to disputes in our datasets are the articles minimising
such costs, and it is notable that taxpayers have increasingly been win-
ning a majority of disputes in G20 countries that relate to treaties with
these non-G20 hubs.7 A second component of the bundle is an increasing
set of procedures implemented in an opaque way, such as mutual
agreements (MAPs), to address tax treaty disputes. Our data suggest a
4 See Volume 2, Chapter 15, ‘Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution: The Global Evolutionary Path’.
5 Capital has a wide deﬁnition here. It includes, e.g., ﬁnancial capital, human capital and
intangible capital. See E. Todder, ‘International Competitiveness: Who Competes against
Whom and for What?’ Tax Law Review, 53 (2012): 509.
6 See Section 5 and Figures 17.8–17.12 below. These ﬁgures show that three non-G20 hubs
are at the centre of the universe of tax treaty disputes in the G20: Switzerland since the
1970s, the Netherlands since the 1990s and Belgium since the 2000s. We call this dynamic
the Copernican Revolution, as, since the 2000s, G20 countries seem to be orbiting these
three non-G20 hubs.
7 See Volume 2, Chapter 14, ‘Patterns of Tax Treaty Disputes: A Global Taxonomy’,
Figure 14.10. Figure 14.10 shows the central patterns of tax disputes between G20
countries and Non-G20 Hubs of the ITR; it exhibits that there have been at least forty-
six patterns of tax treaty disputes between G20 countries and non-G20 hubs in the pre-
BEPS Reports Era. Thirty-ﬁve per cent of the patterns (sixteen out of forty-six) are on the
improper use of the Convention. Tax treaty shopping to minimise source taxation on
passive income (particularly capital gains, dividends and royalties) is the most frequent
scenario. Thirteen per cent of the patterns (six out of forty-ﬁve) are on conﬂicts centred on
the source country tax jurisdictions (particularly immovable property, dividends, royalties
and capital gains). See also Volume 2, Chapter 16, ‘Triple Non-taxation and BEPS: Global
Implications’. It shows how tax treaty law facilitates triple non-taxation and argues that
triple non-taxation under double tax agreements is safe under BEPS as it is not caused by
BEPS practices.
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decline in the number of disputes in OECD countries in recent years,
corresponding to an increase in the number of MAPs.8
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, we explain the
methodology for developing the dataset, including its strengths and
limitations. One important aspect is the approach to standardisation
and comparison of results between countries. Section 3 then outlines
the basic structure of the dataset, including trends over time, in terms of
both absolute numbers and the average shares of disputes across coun-
tries. In Section 4, we highlight jurisdictions whose treaties are most
subject to litigation in G20 countries and examine some of the variations
in the nature of disputes within these jurisdictions. We expand this
analysis further in Section 5 by presenting a dynamic network analysis,
which shows for the ﬁrst time the development of the international tax
regime in terms of court cases, rather than simply by the presence or
absence of a dispute. Section 6 sets out some surprising variations in the
rate of victory in disputes, while Section 7 highlights the trends in the
victory rate by article. In Section 8, we complete the analysis by compar-
ing our data on court cases with the mutual agreement procedure data
published by the OECD. Finally, Section 9 offers a conclusion for this
chapter and the book as a whole.
2 Methodology
2.1 Rationale
The dataset used in this chapter is entitled the ‘G20 Leading Tax Treaty
Case Dataset’ (hereafter referred to as ‘the dataset’).9 It was compiled by
the G20 country authors for this book as an expert survey. Each expert
was asked to compile a list of leading tax treaty disputes in their country
decided in the pre-BEPS Reports Era. The focus on leading cases, rather
than all leading and progeny cases, was designed to create a more
manageable task, but it also has substantive implications. Because leading
cases involve pushing the boundaries of legal interpretation to create new
jurisprudence, they have a different role from progeny cases, which can
be resolved by the courts through existing leading cases.10
8 See Section 8 below. It shows the move from transparent to non-transparent dispute
settlement in countries that are both G20 and OECD members.
9 The dataset is at the following link: www.cambridge.org/baistrocchi.
10 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (Oxford University Press, 1930).
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All cases in the dataset meet the following double test:
1. The case should be a tax treaty dispute, meaning a controversy on the
interpretation and application of tax treaty law to a set of facts. The
dispute must relate to a speciﬁc treaty. So, for example, a transfer
pricing dispute that does not relate to a treaty is not a tax treaty
dispute. The tax treaty must be material to the court’s holding in the
case, and not merely part of its obiter dictum.
2. It should be a leading case, meaning a case so important in the rules of
law determined that it has been cited by an administrative agency or
court as of assistance in resolving a new question of law. We use an
objective test here, which is that the case should have been cited at
least once. This is to ensure that we have an objective and comparable
deﬁnition of ‘leading case’. ‘Administrative agency’ means a revenue
authority at a national or local level.
The dataset includes the case name and reference, the treaty and the
relevant article of the OECD Model Convention (rather than the article
number from the actual treaty), the ﬁrst and last tax years to which the
dispute refers, the verdict year and the outcome. We take the view that
that ﬁrst tax year gives an indication of the decision by a taxpayer to put
in place the particular disputed structure or transaction, while the last tax
year gives an indication of the point at which the tax authority took issue
with the taxpayer’s interpretation of the treaty in its tax returns. The
median number of consecutive ﬁscal years involved in disputes in our
dataset is two, and the median gap between the ﬁnal tax year involved
and the ﬁnal court verdict (including any appeals) is seven years. We do
not have data to tell us when the letters of deﬁciency that triggered the
legal proceedings were sent by tax authorities in our dataset, but we
assume that, with a typical statute of limitations of ﬁve years, the typical
letter of dispute might be expected two years after the ﬁnal ﬁscal year
concerned.
2.2 Standardisation and Reconciliation
The records of disputes were reviewed and standardised by a research
team in London. Ideally, a dataset of this nature, which requires numer-
ous decisions about how to code complex qualitative data into a stand-
ardised format, would have been double coded by two researchers
working independently, with disagreements reconciled by a third coder;
cases would have been assigned randomly among the team to eliminate
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any bias. Given the highly specialised nature of the work and, in particu-
lar, the specialist national knowledge required, this ideal-type coding was
not possible. To reduce the likelihood of bias introduced by using
different coders for each country, our G20 research team undertook
two standardisation exercises.
First, the lists compiled by G20 country authors were reviewed against
an alternative list of tax treaty disputes, the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD) online database.11 This IBFD list of disputes was
also compiled by country authors, but it is not rigorously standardised:
according to one of its editors, the IBFD country authors are asked to
include ‘important’ cases, but no objective deﬁnition of this term is
supplied. Our G20 country authors were therefore asked to check the
lists they had compiled against the IBFD’s list, in particular to re-examine
any discrepancies between the two lists and any differences in the
particulars for cases appearing in both lists.
Second, the deﬁnition of leading tax treaty dispute was discussed
among G20 country authors at the LSE G20 and Beyond Tax Conference
held in London on 30–31 October 2015. This discussion revealed import-
ant differences in national legal systems in the G20 world and a number
of ambiguities in the working deﬁnition. This led to the more speciﬁc
deﬁnition of leading case set out above.12 One result of this discussion
was more detailed recording of case outcomes, where disputes include
multiple articles or treaties. After this conference, the dataset was com-
prehensively revised to ensure that each entry was fully compliant with
the objective deﬁnition of leading tax treaty dispute.
3 The G20 Leading Tax Treaty Dispute
Dataset: Vital Statistics
3.1 Use of Simple Averages across Countries
The use of an objective measure – that a case should have been cited at
least once – rather than a subjective deﬁnition of ‘leading case’ eliminates
much of the subjective bias of individual country authors’ application of
the deﬁnition, but it introduces a different kind of bias. In certain legal
cultures, it is common to cite previous court cases of relevance, even
11 IBFD, ‘IBFD Tax Research Platform’, 2015, available at: http://online.ibfd.org.
12 See Section 2.1, above.
1516 a global analysis of tax treaty disputes: volume 2
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316528945.034
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library, London School of Economics, on 20 Jun 2018 at 17:37:39, subject to the
when they are not materially relevant to the court’s decision; in other
legal cultures, it is not. This cross-country variation creates the impres-
sion that certain countries, in particular, Germany and India, have many
more cases than others. Any comparisons on the basis of absolute
numbers of cases become overwhelmed by these two countries in
particular.
To make up for this, many of the ﬁgures in our analysis use the
proportion of cases, rather than absolute numbers, and we have calcu-
lated the simple average of these proportions across all G20 countries.13
(We have also given the results for two groupings: ‘OECD members’ and
‘BRICS and others’.14) This has the result that, for example, one case in
the United Kingdom, for which the dataset includes thirty-three leading
cases, is given as much importance as around twenty cases in Germany,
for which the dataset includes 618 cases. This means that our dataset is
suitable for comparing variations in the composition of tax cases across
countries over time and across articles, for example, but not absolute
numbers of cases. We mainly draw conclusions about the relative
importance of particular kinds of disputes in different countries based
on the share in those countries’ total disputes. While it is, of course, the
case that there is a greater volume of tax treaty litigation in some
countries than in others, the restriction of analysis to G20 countries
means that we are only focusing on larger economies.
Cases are dated based on the ﬁnal tax year under dispute. When we
refer to ‘cases in the 1990s’, for example, we mean cases covering a
13 We have referred to this technique as ‘normalisation’. This term can have a range of
meanings in statistics, but in this case we use it to refer to converting cases measured on
different scales to a common scale, between 0 and 1. Each case is expressed as a
proportion of all leading cases in the speciﬁc country over the time period of this study.
Three sets of normalised values are used: the proportion of unique leading cases, the
proportion of times an article is featured in a leading case and the proportion of times
that a treaty is featured in a leading case. For example, consider the case of a dispute
regarding Arts. 10 and 23 of the UK–US, UK–France and UK–Germany treaties. In
counting the number of UK cases as part of the normalisation process, this dispute would
be considered as one unique UK dispute, two different articles featured in UK disputes
and three different treaties featured in UK disputes.
14 OECD members includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. BRICS and others
includes Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa. Mexico joined
the OECD in 1994, and South Korea in 1996. Two South Korean leading disputes out of
twelve relate to ﬁscal periods ending before its accession; all Mexican disputes relate to
ﬁscal periods ending after its accession.
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taxable period ending in the 1990s. On average, in the dataset, there is a
6.5-year delay between the ﬁnal tax year under dispute and the ﬁnal
verdict in the case, including any appeals. Added to this, there will be a
lag before a given case is ﬁrst cited in a subsequent case, making it
consistent with our deﬁnition of leading case. As a rule of thumb, this
means that our dataset, which includes cases decided as recently as 2015,
is only reliable for cases in which the ﬁnal tax year under dispute is
2008 or earlier. Even for that year, representing a seven-year delay until a
ﬁnal verdict in 2015, it is likely that only around half of leading cases are
included in our dataset.
3.2 Basic Description of the Cases Included
The dataset includes 1,610 leading tax treaty disputes across the G20
countries.15 There are 2,290 entries because some disputes relate to
multiple articles or treaties. Over 70 per cent of these disputes took place
in two countries, India and Germany, which we believe is primarily an
artefact of our objective deﬁnition of ‘leading case’, rather than a sub-
stantive ﬁnding.
Around 30 per cent of disputes in the dataset relate to tax years in the
2000s, part of a pattern of exponential increases in tax treaty disputes
since the earliest in the dataset, which relate to tax years in the 1940s
(note that ﬁgures for the 2000s are likely to be understated because of the
lead time discussed earlier). As Figures 17.2 and 17.3 show, this trend
holds for both the absolute number of disputes and for the average
proportions across countries.
When the number of disputes is segmented between the eleven OECD
members in the sample and the eight BRICS and other non-members,
there appears to be a slowing down in the rate of increase in disputes in
OECD countries, and an explosion in the number of disputes outside the
OECD. The trend is much more pronounced when absolute numbers of
disputes are used, because there is a drastic reduction in Germany and a
huge increase in India in recent years; the simple average proportions
across countries, which eliminate this distortion, show that the trend still
holds, although it is less dramatic.
15 The G20, in fact, includes nineteen countries and the European Union. Figure 17.1 only
shows eighteen countries, because there are no recorded leading tax treaty disputes in
Saudi Arabia.
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4 Analysis by Treaty Partner
The dataset includes information on the particular treaties disputed, allowing
us to see which countries’ treaty networks are most disputed in (other) G20
members’ courts. Unsurprisingly, given its economic importance, US treaties
are themost commonly litigated in the G20: on average a third of disputes in
each G20 country relate to that country’s treaty with the United States (by
comparison, the next largest country in Figure 17.4, the United kingdom, is
on average the subject of 10 per cent of each country’s disputes). Half of the
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Figure 17.1 All Leading Tax Treaty Disputes by Country of Litigation, in Absolute
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Figure 17.2 Number of Disputes by Decade, Segmented by Country Grouping,
1940s–2000s
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non-G20 countries featuring in the top ten are hub countries – Switzerland,
the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain – the latter the focus of a large share of
disputes with Latin American countries. It is notable that disputes involving
Germany are predominantly of most importance to non-OECD countries.
Analysis of the same data over time in Figures 17.5 and 17.6 shows
that disputes with the United States have become much more important
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Figure 17.4 Share of Disputes by Treaty Partner, Segmented by Country Grouping
in which the Dispute Took Place (simple average across countries)
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Figure 17.3 Share of Disputes by Decade of the Last Fiscal Year Concerned,
Segmented by Country Grouping, 1940s–2000s (simple average across countries)
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in G20 courts in the 2000s, compared with the 1990s when the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom combined were more signiﬁcant than
the United States. Switzerland also seems to be less important in the
1990s and 2000s than in the 1960s and 1980s. Furthermore, Belgium
and Cyprus have emerged as important hubs for G20 disputes in
the 2000s.
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Figure 17.5 Share of Disputes Relating to the Six Most Common G20 Treaty
Partners, by Decade of the Last Fiscal Year Concerned, 1940s–2000s (simple average
across countries)
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Finally, Figure 17.7 shows the ten treaties that are most litigated as a
share of leading cases in any G20 country. For the reader’s reference, the
US–Canada treaty, the most important of all treaties in terms of normal-
ised numbers of disputes, makes up just over 4 per cent of all ‘normal-
ised’ disputes in the dataset.16 In keeping with its economic signiﬁcance,
US treaties are by far the most commonly disputed, constituting seven
out of the ten most disputed treaties. In Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico
and Korea, around half of all tax treaty disputes involve these countries’
treaties with the United States. For the United States, on the contrary, its
treaties with Canada and the United Kingdom are each responsible for
around one-ﬁfth of tax treaty disputes. The other treaties in the top ten
are: Argentina–Brazil, which is the subject of one-quarter of Argentinian
tax treaty disputes; Cyprus–Russia, the subject of one-third of Russian
tax treaty disputes; and Italy–UK, the subject of around one-third of all
disputes in Italy. It is perhaps interesting that Cyprus–Russia is the only
treaty involving a non-G20 country in the top ten.
Figure 17.7 reveals that legal controversy concerning thesemost litigated
treaties takes place overwhelmingly in the country of source. For example,
most disputes related to the Argentina–Brazil tax treaty have emerged in
Argentina, the usual country of source in its interaction with Brazil.
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Figure 17.7 Ten Most Disputed Treaties in the G20, Measured by Each Treaty’s
Combined Share of Total Disputes in the Treaty’s G20 Signatories
16 See fn. 13 for a discussion of ‘normalisation’.
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A similar dynamic can be seen in the interaction between pair of
countries like Australia and the United States, Italy and the United
Kingdom, Canada and the United States, Japan and the United States,
the United Kingdom and the United States. This suggests that tax
authorities in the country of source have sought to resist the impact of
tax treaty law in their country more so than tax authorities in the
country of residence. This is perhaps a logical outcome of the residence
bias inherent in the OECD Model Tax Treaty, under which tax treaties
act more to restrict the taxing rights of the source country than those of
the country of residence.
5 The Evolving Network of Tax Treaty Disputes
Figures 17.8–17.12 are an alternative way to show the information used
in the previous section, which gave an idea of what share particular
treaties and countries represented in the total disputes taking place in
G20 countries. Here we use network analysis to represent graphically the
full universe of leading tax treaty cases in G20 countries. Figures
17.8–17.12 show the network of tax treaty disputes in each decade,
beginning in the 1960s (the ﬁrst decade for which there are enough cases
to draw such a diagram).
G20 countries are shown in black and others in grey. The size of each
country’s node indicates the average share of disputes in other G20
countries that relate to that country. For example, the United States has
the largest node, which tells us that, on a simple average, US treaties
make up the greatest proportion of disputes in G20 countries’ courts
(excluding cases in the United States itself). The thickness of each line
indicates the average share of G20 disputes involving that treaty; between
G20 members, it is the sum of the share of cases from both countries.
A country’s location within Figures 17.8–17.12 is determined using the
technique of principal component analysis. Countries that play the most
similar roles in the G20 dispute network are placed closest together.
Countries at the edges are more different, but this includes countries
with large numbers of disputes concerning their treaties, which form
poles. Other countries’ positions relative to these poles indicate how
closely connected they are to the poles.
A striking feature of Figures 17.9–17.12 is the role of Germany and the
United States as the two major poles of tax treaty disputes, from the
1970s to the present day. These two jurisdictions have the most distinct
and comprehensive patterns of leading tax treaty disputes. From the
1980s onwards, the United Kingdom and India have gravitated towards
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the US pole, forming an ‘Anglo-Saxon pole’ of countries more closely
connected in a web of similar tax treaty disputes. Meanwhile, in the 1990s
and 2000s, the Ibero-American pole seems to form close to, but distinct
from, Germany. Led by Brazil, this grouping also includes Spain, Portu-
gal and Argentina, with Luxembourg a close associate. Between these two
or three poles is a dense mass incorporating the remaining G20 states
Figure 17.8 The G20 Tax Treaty Dispute Network, 1960s
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Figure 17.9 The G20 Tax Treaty Dispute Network, 1970s
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(such as Italy, France and Japan) and a number of hub jurisdictions
(Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Singapore); the location of
these central countries implies that they are bound up in disputes linking
them with the Anglo-Saxon pole and the Ibero-German poles.
Figure 17.10 The G20 Tax Treaty Dispute Network, 1980s
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The evolving size of the nodes also illustrates an interesting evolution
in the role of different jurisdictions. Since the size of a node reﬂects the
importance of a country in disputes taking place in its treaty partners, it
tells us which jurisdictions are most important in tax treaty contention at
a given time. During the 1980s, Switzerland is the most important non-
G20 focus of tax treaty disputes and, in particular, disputes taking place
Figure 17.11 The G20 Tax Treaty Dispute Network, 1990s
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in France and Australia, but also in Germany and the United States. By
the 1990s, Switzerland, while still in the centre of the web, has faded
in terms of the share of disputes, replaced in prominence by the
Netherlands, whose treaties have become contentious in many different
jurisdictions. At this point, UK treaties account for a particularly large
share of disputes in other countries, whereas France has moved away
from the ‘European’ pole, shifting towards the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ part of
the diagram.
Figure 17.12 The G20 Tax Treaty Dispute Network, 2000s
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Finally, in the 2000s, the United States, which has consistently been
among the largest foci of treaty disputes, becomes overwhelmingly dom-
inant, dragging most other participants in the network in its direction.
India, which experiences an unparalleled upsurge in tax treaty disputes in
the 2000s, has pulled away from the system alone.17
For ease of reference, we call this dynamic the ‘Copernican Revolu-
tion’. This is so because three non-G20 hubs are now in the centre of the
universe of leading tax treaty cases in G20 countries. Indeed, Switzerland
is in the centre from the 1970s; the Netherlands and Belgium are also in
the centre from the 1990s and 2000s, respectively.
6 Success Rate
Where possible, we have recorded the outcome of disputes at the highest
court reached by the case. This produces some surprising ﬁndings. First,
as shown in Figure 17.13, the proportion of cases won by the taxpayer
has steadily increased since the 1940s and has been consistently greater
than 50 per cent since the 1980s. A higher success rate by taxpayers may
reﬂect a number of trends, including the growing strength of private
sector advocates, a change in the courts’ attitudes (reﬂected, for example,
by the shift in the United Kingdom from the Duke of Westminster view
to purposive interpretations and the Ramsey principle). Another possible
explanation is that tax authorities have become more aggressive in their
approach to litigation, lowering the threshold for the likelihood of suc-
cess at which they choose to pursue cases.
Figure 17.14 shows the success rate by country. There are marked
differences within the OECD, ranging from a government success rate of
around three-quarters in the United Kingdom to as little as one-third in
France. There is no clear difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ worlds,
with a wide range of results among non-OECD and emerging market
OECD member countries. A particularly low government success rate in
India is perhaps unsurprising, although the 100 per cent rate in China
deserves an explanation: our data for China are based on tax authority
17 The unique positions of Germany and India in this ﬁnal diagram may also reﬂect the
large number of leading tax treaty disputes in these countries according to our objective
deﬁnition. Although normalisation prevents the overwhelming number of disputes from
giving these countries undue weight, the larger number of disputes included for these two
countries inevitably means that a greater number of different treaties signed by these
jurisdictions are included within our dataset.
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rulings, not independent court judgments. There have been only four
court judgments on tax treaty disputes in China in the pre-BEPS Reports
Era. All judgments have upheld the decisions of the local tax authorities.
When the success rate is compared across the most commonly dis-
puted treaty partners discussed previously, the variation is even more
dramatic. Whereas French authorities have one of the lowest success
rates, other G20 countries’ authorities have the highest success rate
in court cases involving French treaties. Taxpayers are particularly
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Figure 17.13 Government Victory Rate by Decade, Segmented by Country Grouping,
1940s–2000s (simple average across countries)
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Figure 17.14 Government Victory Rate by Country in which the Dispute Took Place
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successful in G20 court disputes involving treaties with the Netherlands
and Switzerland, perhaps because tax authorities are more aggres-
sive in challenging tax structures involving these two jurisdictions
(Figure 17.15).
Figures 17.16 and 17.17 compare the success rate across each article,
Figure 17.17 focusing on only the most commonly disputed articles.
There are, again, dramatic variations. Among the most commonly dis-
puted articles, taxpayers win in three-quarters of cases concerning the
deﬁnition of permanent establishment (Article 5), but only one-ﬁfth of
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Figure 17.15 Government Victory Rate by Treaty Partner (simple average across
countries in which the dispute took place)
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Figure 17.16 Government Victory Rate by Article, All Articles (simple average across
countries)
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cases concerning capital gains (Article 13). Figures 17.17 and 17.18 may
illustrate why the BEPS process has included signiﬁcant work to reform
Article 5.
7 Analysis by Article
As Figures 17.18 and 17.19 indicate, the most common disputes relate to
Articles 5, 7, 9, 10–12 and 13 of the OECD Model Convention, a pattern
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Figure 17.17 Government Victory Rate by Article, Most Commonly Disputed
Articles (simple average across countries)
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Figure 17.18 Number of Disputes Concerning the Most Commonly Disputed
Articles, Segmented by Country Grouping
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that holds whether absolute numbers or average shares of cases are used.
Articles 15 and 23a are very common when absolute values are used, but
not when the average share of disputes across all countries; in both cases,
this is a result of the very large number of disputes concerning these
articles taking place in Germany, for which the raw ﬁgures based on our
deﬁnition of leading case are much higher.
Figure 17.20 gives a breakdown of the share of these disputes for each
country. It reveals a very heterogeneous pattern, indicating that different
articles are more controversial in different countries:
• Article 5 is rarely the subject of more than 10 per cent of disputes, and
never more than 15 per cent.
• Article 7 is of particular importance in Brazil, where it is the subject
of half of all disputes, and in Australia, where it makes up one-
third.
• Article 9 constitutes a large number of cases in Japan, Argentina and
India. Transfer pricing cases are normally fact-speciﬁc, so they hardly
become leading tax treaty disputes within the wording of our deﬁnition
of leading tax treaty dispute.
• Article 10 is of most importance to Italy, Korea, Turkey and Russia.
• Article 11 is most disputed in Mexico and Indonesia.
• Article 12 is most disputed in Italy, Turkey and Argentina.
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Figure 17.19 Share of Disputes Concerning the Most Commonly Disputed Articles,
Segmented by Country Grouping (simple average across countries)
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• Article 13 is rarely contested in Europe and North America, but
constitutes a high share of disputes in Mexico, Korea and China.
To understand these trends in more detail, Figure 17.21 presents a
dynamic analysis of the growth in disputes concerning these articles over
time, segmented between OECD members and non-members. Only dis-
putes taking place since the 1980s have been included, because before this
period, the number of disputes is too small for a meaningful analysis.
A particular surprise from this ﬁgure is Article 7: there is a signiﬁcant
growth in the share of Article 7 disputes from the 1990s to the 2000s among
non-OECD countries, but a huge decline within OECD countries. This may
imply the dwindling importance of permanent establishments in multi-
national companies’ structures in OECD countries and a growing import-
ance for these same structures in BRICS countries. Another surprise is that,
despite the high proﬁle of certain capital gains cases outside the OECD
(especially Vodafone India), Article 13 accounts for a small share of non-
OECD disputes, and a larger share within the OECD. The consistently large
role of Article 12 in both groups, however, supports the view that intellectual
property has been important both for the global economy and for tax
planning since the 1980s.18
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Figure 17.20 Share of Disputes Concerning the Most Commonly Disputed Articles,
by Country in which the Dispute Took Place
18 See Volume 2, Chapter 15, ‘Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution: The Global Evolutionary
Path’.
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Figure 17.22 in this section highlights the most contentious individual
treaty articles, combining the ﬁgures for disputes in both treaty partners
where they are G20 members.19 Remarkably, over half of the sixteen
entries for Korea relate to just two articles: Article 13 of the Korea–
Belgium treaty and Article 4 of the Korea–US treaty. (For the reader’s
reference, the disputes related to these two articles make up 1 per cent
each of all the normalised treaty disputes in our dataset.20) Royalty
provisions in treaties between Argentina and Spain, and between Italy
and the United States, are both the subject of a ﬁfth or more of cases
in Argentina and Italy, respectively, whereas the business proﬁts and
interest articles of the Australia–US treaty make up 40 per cent of all
Australia’s disputes. We saw above that the Cyprus–Russia treaty
constitutes one-third of Russia’s leading tax treaty disputes and
Figure 17.22 reveals that all of these disputes concern this treaty’s
dividend article. Article 5 of the US–Canada treaty is the only article
in the top ten list where contention is balanced between the two
treaty partners, making up around 8 per cent of disputes in both
countries.
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Figure 17.21 Share of Disputes Concerning the Most Commonly Disputed Articles,
by Decade of the Last Fiscal Year Concerned, and by Country Grouping
19 China is necessarily excluded, because with only four cases, each case represents 25 per
cent of the total, and would automatically be included in Figure 17.22.
20 See fn. 13 for a discussion of ‘normalisation’.
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8 Comparison with Mutual Agreement Procedures
Mutual agreement procedures (MAPs) provide taxpayerswith an alternative
or, in some countries, a parallel route through which to challenge a tax
authority’s assessment. Taxpayers may choose MAPs instead of court cases
for a number of reasons, including to avoid the costs of court representation,
to ensure a result that eliminates double taxation and to prevent the publi-
cation of the particulars of the case in court records. Whatever the reason,
our data below, when combined with the OECDMAP statistics,21 effectively
suggest an OECD trend towards MAPs and away from court cases.
First, while our methodology for court cases does not allow for a cross-
country comparison of dispute numbers, we can make such a compari-
son for MAPs, where the reporting is comprehensive. It shows that the
United States and Germany dominate the numbers of reported MAPs in
countries that are both OECD and G20 members (we have used this
subset of MAP statistics to maintain compatibility with our own dataset
and maximise the number of years for which full OECD data are
available).
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Figure 17.22 Ten Most Disputed Treaty Articles in the G20, Measured by Combined
Share of Disputes in the Treaty’s G20 Signatories
21 OECD, ‘Mutual Agreement Procedure Statistics for 2014’, 2015, available at:
www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/map-statistics-2014.htm, last accessed 21 May 2014.
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Figure 17.24 compares the change in the number of new leading tax
treaty court disputes in our dataset with the growth in the number of
new MAP cases. Germany has the second largest number of MAP cases
in the OECD data since 2006, while our new data on court cases up to
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Figure 17.24 Share of All Leading Tax Treaty Court Cases, 1990–2008, by Last Fiscal
Year Concerned, Compared with Share of MAP Disputes by Year Lodged, 2006–2014
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
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2008 show a big decline in German cases in the 2000s, which suggests
that German taxpayers are moving from court cases to MAPs. Looking at
the average share of cases each year, a steady increase during the 1990s
and early 2000s appears to have been replaced by a decline in the share of
leading tax treaty disputes since a high watermark in 2004.
9 Conclusion
The following theory can be inferred from the data offered in this book.
The core architecture of the ITR is a ‘co-opetition’ game22 implemented
by means of a two-sided platform.23 To infer this theory, ﬁve major
assumptions are made here.
(1) The OECD and BRICS countries are market leaders for quasi-legal
rules.24 (Indeed, the OECD describes its Committee on Fiscal Affairs as ‘a
market leader in developing standards and guidelines in the core of
International Taxation.’)25 This small group of countries cooperates on
an ongoing basis in the production of international tax soft law (i.e., the
OECD Model and related documents, including the 2015 BEPS Reports)
with systemic feedback from international taxpayers, the global commu-
nity of tax advisers and tax scholars.26 The OECD can thus be seen as a
22 A ‘co-opetition’ game is a game in which elements of cooperation and competition are
mixed simultaneously. See E. A. Baistrocchi, ‘The International Tax Regime and the BRIC
World: Elements for a Theory’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33(4) (2013), available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336294. See also A. M. Brandenburger and B. J. Nalebuff, Co-
opetition (London: Proﬁle Books, 1996).
23 A two-sided platform aims to minimise transaction costs between platform users who can
beneﬁt from coming together, facilitating the occurrence of value-creating exchanges that
would not otherwise take place. The core role of a two-sided platform is to enable parties
to realise gains from interactions by reducing transaction costs. D. S. Evans, ‘Two-Sided
Market Deﬁnition’, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Market Deﬁnition in Antitrust: Theory
and Case Studies available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396751, last accessed 26 Decem-
ber 2015.
24 A. T. Guzman and T. Meyer, ‘International Soft Law’, UC Berkeley Public Law Research
Paper No. 1353444, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1353444, last accessed 26
December 2015.
25 OECD, Focus on Africa (Paris: OECD Publishing, n.d.), available at: www.oecd.org/ctp/
40998413.pdf, last accessed 22 May 2016.
26 The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs consults with interested parties through a variety
of means to inform on its work in the tax area. One important way of obtaining such
input is through the release of requests for input or discussion drafts for public comment
and through public consultations. See, e.g., OECD, ‘Previous Requests for input’, available
at: www.oecd.org/tax/previous-requests-for-input.htm, last accessed 26 December 2015.
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vehicle to minimise collective action cost for the production of inter-
national tax soft law (the OECD Model),27 a focal point around which
actors can converge in a negotiating context with multiple stable
equilibria.28
(2) Virtually all countries are now increasingly using the OECDModel
and related documents (including the UN Model) for two different
purposes: (i) as a template for their own tax treaty network and relevant
domestic law; and (ii) as a source of innovation for their tax treaties
without the need for renegotiation. This approach to using international
tax soft law may be explained by the delegation theory: ‘states choose soft
law when they are uncertain whether the rules they adopt today will be
desirable tomorrow and when it is advantageous to allow a particular
group of states to adjust expectations in the event of changed circum-
stances’.29 As a result, the OECD Model and related documents are
international tax soft law which is, in turn, a key driving force of the
ITR. This is so because once the OECDModel and related documents are
integrated into a relevant country’s tax law, they become hard law.
(3) Countries are habitually engaged in international tax competi-
tion within a compatible standard (rather than between incompatible
standards as it occurred before 1923).30 The current compatible standard
is the OECD Model, which channels international tax competition into
areas that are not regulated by the OECD Model, such as corporate
tax rates.31
See also A. Christians, ‘Taxation in a Time of Crisis: Policy Leadership from the OECD to
the G20’, Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy, 5 (Spring 2010).
27 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard
University Press, 1971).
28 T. Rixen, The Political Economy of International Tax Governance (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008); C. M. Radaelli, ‘Game Theory and Institutional Entrepreneurship:
Transfer Pricing and the Search for Coordination International Tax Policy’, Policy Studies
Journal, 26(4) (1998): 603–19.
29 Guzman and Meyer, ‘International Soft Law’. See also J. E. Gersen and E. A. Posner, ‘Soft
Law’, Stanford Law Review, 61 (2008): 73, which maintains that soft law consists of rules
issued by law-making bodies that do not comply with the procedural formalities neces-
sary to give the rules legal status. Nonetheless, soft law may inﬂuence the behaviour of
public and other lawmaking bodies. See also A. T. Guzman and T. Meyer, ‘International
Soft Law’, Journal of Legal Analysis, 2 (2011): 171.
30 T. Dagan, ‘Pay as You Wish: Globalization, Forum Shopping, and Distributive Justice’,
20 June 2014, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457212.
31 M. A. Sullivan, ‘UK Road to Competitiveness Is Paved with Tax Increases’, 23 April 2012,
available at: www.taxanalysts.com/taxcom/taxblog.nsf/Permalink/UBEN-8TMJF8?Open
Document, last accessed 26 December 2012.
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(4) The OECDModel has the standard features of all network markets:
network externalities, expectations and lock-in effects.32
(5) The OECD Model’s compatible standard is capable of destroy-
ing incompatible standards (such as the Andean Model)33 and
preventing other different, albeit compatible, standards (such as
the UN Model and emerging regional models as in COMESA,
SADC and ASEAN) from converging signiﬁcantly from the OECD
Model.34
The data presented in this book suggest that OECD countries,
BRICS countries and non-G20 hubs are different key nodes of the
same global network tax market: the ITR. The net effect of the ITR
has evolved over time and space, from avoiding international double
taxation35 to offering a two-sided platform that fosters international
32 Network markets normally have three main features: network, expectations and lock-in
effects. Network effects denote that the larger the number of members of the network, the
better for each of them. The classic example of network effects can be seen in the
telephone system. Indeed, the relative value of having a telephone is related to the number
of telephones being used in the network. (For an analysis of network externalities in
corporate law, see M. Kahan and M. Klausner, ‘Standarization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting’, Virginia Law Review, 83 (1997): 713.) Expectation is another
feature in any network market. In effect, one standard may prevail over another, not
because it is better, but because it is sponsored by an inﬂuential player. For example, the
initial success of MS-DOS is usually attributed not to any technical superiority, but
because it was supported by IBM. (The impact of expectations in banking law is focused
on in D. W. Diamond and P. H. Dybvig, ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 24 (Winter 2000): 14.) Finally, a
lock-in effect is frequent in any network market because better products that arrive later
in time may be unable to displace a technologically inferior one that arrived earlier. An
example of the lock-in effect is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. See Baistrocchi, ‘The
International Tax Regime and the BRIC World: Elements for a Theory’.
33 A. Atchabahian et al., Fiscal Harmonization in the Andean Countries (International
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 1975).
34 A fundamental element of the OECD Model technology is the distinction between active
and passive income and the different allocations of tax jurisdictions depending on this
distinction. For example, the OECD Model grants the country of source preeminent
taxing rights on active income, whereas the country of residence is granted pre-eminent
taxing rights over passive income. The Andean Model does not accept this distinction: all
income, be it active or passive, is exclusively taxed by the country of source. Hence, the
OECD and Andean models are incompatible. There are now only two bilateral tax
treaties based on the Andean Model, i.e., those concluded by Argentina with Bolivia
and Brazil. See S. Zebel, ‘What Lies Beneath the Convention to Avoid Double Taxation
Subscribed between Brazil and Argentina? An Argentine Perspective’ (unpublished).
35 See Volume 2, Chapter 14, in particular, Pattern 62 (94Nu7843, South Korea).
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tax competition among jurisdictions.36 The two-sided platform of the
ITR is currently the OECD Model.37
On one side of the platform, the central users are leading jurisdictions,
particularly OECD countries, BRICS countries and non-G20 hubs, spe-
ciﬁcally Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium.38 On the other side of
the platform, the central users are international investors (such as
MNEs). All OECD and BRICS countries offer international investors
different bundled products, including institutional quality, connectivity
to markets (including connectivity to non-G20 hubs), talent clusters and
regulations such as a mix of domestic and tax treaty laws that may
minimise both tax entry costs and tax exit costs for the relevant
jurisdictions.
There is reinforcing feedback between international tax com-
petition for capital, tax treaty law and domestic law. International
taxpayers have been demanding39 that their G20 residence coun-
tries sign OECD-based tax treaties with G20 source countries and
non-G20 hubs to minimise both their tax entry costs40 and tax
36 On the meaning of the two-sided platform and its application to the international tax
systems, see Baistrocchi, ‘The International Tax Regime and the BRIC World: Elements
for a Theory’.
37 See Volume 2, Chapter 16, ‘Triple Non-Taxation and BEPS: Global Implications’.
38 See Figure 17.12, above.
39 Early examples of taxpayers’ demands for regulations to alleviate international double
taxation are found, for instance, in the appeals to the 1919 International Chamber of
Commerce and the 1920 Brussels Financial Conference, where it was argued that the
newly created League of Nations should do something to eliminate the ‘evils’ of double
taxation. M. B. Carroll, Global Perspectives of an International Tax Lawyer (New York:
Exposition Press, 1978), p. 29.
40 The reductions of tax entry costs can be implemented, e.g., under Art. 5 of the OECD
Model. The French case in Zimmer is an example. The issue was whether a commission-
aire agent had constituted a PE of its foreign principal. The Zimmer case involved a
commissionaire agreement between Zimmer Ltd, a UK company and Zimmer SAS, a
French enterprise. The French enterprise was selling goods owned by the UK company in
its own name. The risks were assumed by the UK company as it owned the goods until
they were purchased by end-customers. In France, the Conseil d’État held that a com-
missionaire could not constitute a PE of its foreign principal, whereas the Court of First
Instance and the Court of Appeal found that the UK company had a permanent
establishment in France. As the existence of a PE was assessed on the basis of the
dependent agent rule, a core issue involved whether or not a commissionaire had acted
in the name of the principal and had had the possibility to bind the principal. According
to French civil law, a commissionaire acts in its own name on behalf of the principal and
the principal is not contractually bound with the end-client. The Court of First Instance
and the Court of Appeal found that Zimmer UK had a PE in France on the basis of
factual considerations such as the possibility of Zimmer France negotiating prices without
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exit costs.41 A similar demand can be seen in G20 source countries
to sign tax treaties with G20 residence countries and non-G20
hubs.42 A comparable demand can be seen in non-G20 hubs to sign
tax treaties with both residence and source G20 countries.43 More-
over, taxpayers have increasingly been winning tax treaty disputes
in both the country of source and the country of residence in
disputes on international tax planning techniques normally involving
entities based on non-G20 hubs.44 Tax treaty disputes have emerged
more frequently in the country of source than in the country of
residence.45 Tax treaty disputes in non-G20 hubs are infrequent.46
The South Korean case in DM Food47 and the Brazilian case in
being authorised by Zimmer UK, as well as the control exercised by the principal on the
commissionaire. The Conseil d’État adopted a purely legal view in the Zimmer case.
Accordingly, it was held that a commissionaire could not bind the principal given the
status of a commissionaire in French civil law; accordingly, by concluding contracts in its
own name, a commissionaire did not bind the principal, thereby precluding the existence
of an agent PE. The Conseil d’État seems to have paid less attention to the facts than is
recommended by the Commentary on Art. 5 of the OECD MTC; it instead focused
purely on the legal relationship between the principal and the commissionaire. See
Conseil d’État, 31 March 2010, case Nos. 304715 and 308525, Zimmer. See also Volume
1, Chapter 7, ‘France’.
41 The reductions in tax exit costs can be implemented, e.g., under Art. 7 of the OECD
Model. The Australian case in Thiel is an example. The taxpayer was a Swiss resident who
had purchased units in an Australian trust. He subsequently sold his units in the trust to a
company for a purchase price to be paid in shares of the company. The company shares
were subsequently listed on the stock exchange and the taxpayer sold his shares. When
assessed on his proﬁts from the share sale, the taxpayer argued that the proﬁts from the
share sale were exempt from taxation under Art. 7(1) or 13(3) of the Australia–
Switzerland treaty. As the parties had agreed that there was no PE, the issue was whether
or not the proﬁts in question pertained to an enterprise carried on by a resident of
Switzerland (application of Art. 7 depended on there being a PE). The Court’s interpret-
ation was guided by public international law principles as embodied in the Vienna
Convention and the Court looked to the OECD Model and Commentary to conclude
that an enterprise may be established by a single transaction if it was entered into for
business or commercial purposes. Thus, the taxpayer’s acquisition and sale of shares had
been undertaken with enough business and commercial purposes to constitute an
enterprise. As the taxpayer’s enterprise was not carried on through a PE in Australia,
the application of Art. 7(1) of the treaty to protect the taxpayer’s proﬁts from the
transactions at issue were not assessable in Australia. See Thiel v. Commissioner of
Taxation [1990] HCA 37. See also Volume 1, Chapter 3, ‘Australia’.
42 See Volume 1, Chapter 16, ‘Turkey’. 43 See Volume 2, Chapter 13, ‘Singapore’.
44 See Volume 2, Chapter 14, Table 14.1. 45 See Figure 17.7.
46 See Volume 2, Chapter 3, ‘Hong Kong’.
47 In the DM Food case, a Hong Kong resident company (HKCo.) held indirect ownership
on stock of a Korean resident company through a chain of intermediate entities. HKCo.
owned a 60 percent interest in a US LLC, which elected to be treated as a ﬁscally
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Vale48 are examples of this reinforcing feedback in OECD and
BRICS countries, respectively; the DM Food case involved entities
based in Hong Kong, the United States, Luxembourg, Belgium and
South Korea; the Vale case, in turn, involved entities based in
Belgium, Bermuda, Luxembourg and Brazil. The increasing success
rate of taxpayers in tax treaty litigation since the 1960s49 has had an
increasing incentive on international taxpayers to demand more tax
treaty law in G20 residence countries, G20 source countries and
non-G20 hubs50 in their search for triple non-taxation opportunities
(the reinforcing feedback).51
Technological innovations, such as the international trade of intan-
gibles, emerged in North America and Europe in the 1960s and then
expanded to Asia and the rest of the world since the 1990s.52 These
technological innovations accelerated the reinforcing feedback because
transparent partnership for US federal income tax purposes. The US LLC owned a 35.3
per cent interest in a Luxembourg Sarl (LuxCo.) and LuxCo., in turn, owned an 88.75 per
cent stake in a Belgian company (BelCo.). BelCo. was the direct owner of stock in a
Korean company. When BelCo. disposed of the Korean stock and realised capital gains,
the withholding agent did not withhold Korean taxes because the Belgium treaty exempts
a Belgian resident’s capital gains arising from the disposition of Korean stock. The
Belgian National Tax Service (NTS), however, decided that BelCo. was a mere conduit,
and the appellate court also disregarded BelCo. under the substance-over-form doctrine.
The appellate court, however, held that HKCo.’s allocable share of BelCo.’s capital gains
was not subject to Korean taxation, on the premise that the US LLC was regarded as a US
tax resident under the US treaty (and subject to the beneﬁts afforded under the Korea–US
tax treaty). On appeal to the Supreme Court, even though the higher court agreed with
the appellate court that LuxCo. and BelCo. should be disregarded under the given facts, it
did not agree that HKCo.’s allocable share of capital gains was not subject to Korean
taxation. In overturning the appellate court’s decision and remanding it, the Supreme
Court held that, under Art. 3(1)(b)(ii) of the Korea–US tax treaty, any US entity that is
ﬁscally transparent in the United States and yet is considered a non-transparent corpor-
ation under Korean domestic law is entitled to the beneﬁts of the US treaty, but only to
the extent that its high-ranking members/partners are subject to taxation in the United
States. DM Food v. Head of Seocho Tax Ofﬁce, 2012 Du11836, Supreme Court of Korea,
June 2014. See Volume 1, Chapter 14, ‘South Korea’ and Volume 2, Chapter 14, ‘Patterns
of Tax Treaty Disputes’, Pattern 3.
48 The Vale SA case. See volume 2, Chapter 4, ‘Brazil’. 49 See Figure 17.13.
50 The expansion of the tax treaty network has been exponential. See E. Neumayer, ‘Do
Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?’,
Journal of Development Studies, 43(8) (2006): 1501–19, available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=766064.
51 See Volume 2, Chapter 16, ‘Triple non-taxation and BEPS’.
52 E. Baistrocchi, ‘Transfer Pricing Dispute Resolution: The Global Evolutionary Path’, in
E. Baistrocchi and I. Roxan (eds), Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes: A Global Analysis
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 835–83.
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capital became increasingly mobile and this, in turn, triggered a sharp
increase in tax treaty litigation over the scope of Article 12 (royalties),
ﬁrst in North America and Europe in the 1980s and then in Asia and the
rest of the G20 world since the 2000s.53 The evolution of the patterns in
Article 12 litigation over time and space is a representative example of
the impact of technological innovations on the ITR.54
The reinforcing feedback dynamic has probably produced at least
three net effects on the structure of the ITR. First, three non-G20 hubs
are at the centre of the universe of tax treaty disputes in the G20:
Switzerland since the 1970s, the Netherlands since the 1990s and Bel-
gium since the 2000s (the three non-G20 hubs). We call this dynamic the
‘Copernican Revolution’, as G20 countries seem to have been orbiting the
three non-G20 hubs since the 2000s. Second, there has been an increas-
ing number of triple non-taxation opportunities generated by the inter-
action of domestic and tax treaty law in OECD countries, BRICS
countries and non-G20 hubs. The Google case in the United Kingdom
and the Andolan case in India are two examples of these triple non-
taxation opportunities based on both domestic and tax treaty laws of the
relevant countries.55 Triple non-taxation is not desirable because it
induces, for example, free-riding behaviour. Third, there has been
increasing opacity of the ITR given the increasing relevance of MAPS
and tax arbitration implemented in a less than transparent way.56 This
increasing opacity is not desirable for at least two reasons: (a) it is not
consistent with the core principles of liberal democracy because it sub-
stantially limits accountability and, thus, a well-functioning political
process;57 (b) it may induce countries to behave like cartels.58
The reinforcing feedback can hardly be changed because of the high
collective action costs involved; there are at least sixty jurisdictions
involved in this strategic game: the G20 and forty non-G20 countries.59
All these G20 and beyond countries seem to have been orbiting the three
non-G20 hubs since the 2000s. There is an option, however, that we
53 See Figure 17.12. 54 See fn. 36. 55 See Volume 2, Chapter 6, ‘India’.
56 See Figure 17.24.
57 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). H. Spector,
‘The Theory of Constitutional Review’, in M. A. Jovanović (ed.), Constitutional Review
and Democracy (The Hague: Eleven, 2015), available at: www.academia.edu/12191488/_
The_Theory_of_Constitutional_Review_in_Miodrag_A._Jovanovi%C4%87_ed._Consti
tutional_Review_and_Democracy_Eleven_The_Hague_2015.
58 See fn. 28. 59 See Figure 17.12.
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think the OECD and G20 should attempt to move the ITR to a new and
better equilibrium point: more transparency in all central dimensions of
this strategic game. This includes the automatic exchange of information
and more transparent MAPS and tax arbitration to deter countries from
behaving like cartels and free-riders, in a further push to solve problems
with the core principles of liberal democracy. The suggested procedural
option is grounded on the fact that procedural articles (Articles 24–31)
have been consistently less litigated than deﬁnitional and substantive
articles in the pre-BEPS Reports Era.60
Countries are relatively more constrained by the ITR when enacting
regulations such as tax treaties than when enforcing them.61 The bound-
aries of a strategic enforcement of the ITR can be framed within the
116 patterns of the tax treaty disputes crystallised in the global taxonomy
offered in Chapter 14. These patterns show the central role of non-G20
hubs in this network tax market during the pre-BEPS Reports Era.62 The
net effect of tax treaty dispute patterns has decreased tax entry costs and/
or tax exit costs. Global tax competition has emerged in a number of
areas, including competition for ﬁnancial capital,63 human capital,64 tax
revenue65 and connectivity to other global network markets, such as
business law.66
In sum, a new logic has emerged in the strategic interaction among
G20 countries and non-G20 nodes in the pre-BEPS Reports Era
(1932–2015). G20 countries increasingly compete against each other for
capital, just as private ﬁrms compete for market share.67 The ITR makes
visible this new logic. In bilateral tax treaties that G20 countries conclude
with non-G20 hubs, the latter serve as outlets for the bundled products
that G20 countries offer to international investors. One component of the
bundle is the tax treaty network in its interaction with the relevant
domestic laws, which is a vehicle to minimise the tax entry costs and/
or tax exit costs. A second component is a set of procedures implemented
60 See Volume 2, Chapter 14.
61 The Bloomberg cases emerging with similar facts in both Russia and South Korea are
examples of the room local courts may have when interpreting and applying tax treaty
law. See Volume 2, Chapter 14, Patterns 52(1) and 52(2).
62 See Volume 2, Chapter 14, Table 14.1.
63 Volume 2, Chapter 14, Pattern 13, Prévost case (France).
64 Volume 2, Chapter 14, Pattern 73, Swiss cyclist case (Switzerland).
65 Volume 2, Chapter 14, Pattern 1, Molinos case (Argentina).
66 Volume 2, Chapter 14, Pattern 78, George Anson case (United Kingdom).
67 See fn. 22 above.
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in an opaque way, such as mutual agreements, to address tax disputes.
Examples of the strategic interaction between G20 countries and non-
G20 hubs68 include the strategic interaction between Argentina and
Chile,69 Brazil and the Netherlands,70 Canada and the Netherlands,71
China and Hong Kong,72 India and Mauritius,73 Indonesia and the
Netherlands,74 Mexico and Switzerland,75 Russia and Cyprus,76 South
Africa and Switzerland,77 South Korea and Belgium,78 Turkey and the
Netherlands,79 and the United States and the Netherlands.80
From a policy-making perspective, the international tax system is at a
crossroads. One way to push forward is to preserve and encourage
competition between G20 countries in the same way that competition
among private ﬁrms is encouraged. Another option is to limit competi-
tion by implementing mechanisms to enhance transparency, limiting the
scope for procedures implemented in opaque ways and encouraging the
automatic exchange of information. The G20/OECD BEPS Reports is
located somewhere in between these two alternative policy options.
Indeed, the context is challenging given the emerging fourth industrial
revolution.81
68 This sort of bilateral strategic interaction between G20 countries and non-G20 nodes
might be unstable, i.e., it may collapse. The Argentina–Chile strategic interaction and its
collapse is a case in point. See Volume 2, Chapter 8, ‘Argentina’. See also the India–
Mauritius interaction and its potential collapse: ‘India gets right to tax capital gain from
Mauritius in new treaty’, available at: www.moneycontrol.com/news/cnbc-tv18-com
ments/india-gets-right-to-tax-capital-gainmauritusnew-treaty_6607421.html.
69 For example, US investors show a preference for investing in Argentina through a tax
treaty partner. In this respect, US$1,270 million of US investments in the mining and
automotive industries are channelled through companies located in Chile, and another
US$760 million of investments in the oil industry are funnelled through companies
domiciled in Denmark, another treaty partner of Argentina. See Volume 2, Chapter 8,
‘Argentina’.
70 See Volume 2, Chapter 4, ‘Brazil’.
71 See Velcro Industries 2012 TCC 57, Tax Court of Canada, in Volume 1, Chapter 4,
‘Canada’.
72 See Volume 2, Chapter 3, ‘Hong Kong’. 73 See Volume 2, Chapter 6, ‘India’.
74 See Volume 2, Chapter 11, ‘Indonesia’. 75 See Volume 1, Chapter 12, ‘Mexico’.
76 See Volume 2, Chapter 5, ‘Russia’. 77 See Volume 2, Chapter 7, ‘South Africa’.
78 See Volume 1, Chapter 14, ‘South Korea’.
79 See Volume 1, Chapter 16, ‘Turkey’. For example, the tax treaty between Turkey and the
Netherlands is the only one in the Turkish tax treaty network without the beneﬁcial
owner concept.
80 See, e.g., the loopholes in the limitation of beneﬁts provision under the US–Netherlands
treaty. See also Volume 1, Chapter 2, ‘United States’.
81 See Volume 1, Chapter 1, ‘Introduction’.
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